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Abstract—Arguments in safety cases are predominantly
qualitative. This is partly attributed to the lack of sufficient
design and operational data necessary to measure the achieve-
ment of high-dependability targets, particularly for safety-
critical functions implemented in software. The subjective
nature of many forms of evidence, such as expert judgment
and process maturity, also contributes to the overwhelming
dependence on qualitative arguments. However, where data for
quantitative measurements is systematically collected, quanti-
tative arguments provide far more benefits over qualitative
arguments, in assessing confidence in the safety case. In this
paper, we propose a basis for developing and evaluating inte-
grated qualitative and quantitative safety arguments based on
the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and Bayesian Networks
(BN). The approach we propose identifies structures within
GSN-based arguments where uncertainties can be quantified.
BN are then used to provide a means to reason about confidence
in a probabilistic way. We illustrate our approach using a
fragment of a safety case for an unmanned aerial system and
conclude with some preliminary observations.
Keywords-Safety case; safety; uncertainty analysis; measure-
ment; bayesian networks
I. INTRODUCTION
NOTE: Introduction to the context / problem:
- Why safety cases are important? - Importance of ex-
plicit reasoning, through structured arguments, within safety
cases - Its inevitable that a big part of the reasoning is
subjective and inductive, partly because of uncertainties in
the argument and evidence (inherited from uncertainties in
system development, assessment and operation) - However
probabilistic reasoning is the natural way, from an engineer-
ing perspective, for addressing uncertainties and the lack
of full assurance (e.g. risks at the system level are often
stated in quantitative terms) - We acknowledge our inability
to fully quantify assurance and propose to address this by an
approach that exploits the benefits of integrating qualitative
and qualitative reasoning within a safety case by using GSN
and BN.
NOTE: Quantification is not for assignment of SIL / DAL
and computing corresponding confidence level. Rather the
goal is to compute / measure the confidence in the safety
argument and use this as a basis for making decisions i.e. to
accept the safety argument or reject it. The reason for this
is simple: no one can make sense of SILs and DALs. The
rationale behind these is not documented anywhere!
This paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses
related work in the literature. In section III, we present
our proposed approach for the quantification of uncertainty
(confidence) in safety cases: specifically, we describe the
illustrative example safety argument in section III-A, and
the quantification model in section III-B. We discuss our
approach in section IV and conclude with directions for
future work in section V
II. RELATED WORK
NOTE: Short review of the two main camps: pro- and
anti- quantification of assurance and how this is addressed
in safety standards (Safety Integrity and Assurance Levels
SILs and DALs)
NOTE: Related important work: [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
NOTE: A few words here on what our general approach
is, for uncertainty measurement: An approach where GSN
is used to construct the primary safety argument and BN
is constructed to quantify confidence where enough data is
available
NOTE: Also need an introduction to GSN Short intro to
BN.
A. Illustrative Example
Figure 1 shows a fragment of the safety argument, de-
scribed using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [6] for
the airborne subsystem of an experimental unmanned aerial
system (UAS), being developed at NASA Ames Research
Center. In the context of the overall UAS safety case and
the corresponding hazard analysis, the correct functioning of
the autopilot in the airborne system has been determined to
be one of many functional safety requirements for mitigating
certain hazards e.g., drifting outside the range-safety area. In
decomposing the goal corresponding to this functional safety
requirement, the correct calculation of the angle of attack of
the aircraft (G1) is one sub-goal. In this paper we discuss
ways to measure confidence in the argument and quantify
the uncertainty in this claim.
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Figure 1. Fragment of the safety case of the airborne subsystem of the UAS.
As shown in the figure, we address G1 by arguing that
(1) G1.1: the Pitot (air-data) probe provides the correct
sensor values to the autopilot (2) G2.1: the specification
is correct and (3) G2.2: the implementation of this spec-
ification is also correct. In turn, these claims are justified
in part (using the strategies shown in Figure 1) by (1)
E1: evidence arising from empirical data wind tunnel
experiments about correctly calibrating the air-data probe
(2) E2: subjective assessment of the formula used in the
specification as evidenced by the outcome of a review, (3)
E3: formal verification of the implementation, using a proof
of correctness, and (4) E4: evidence of low probability of
failure on demand (PFD) obtained from sensor datasheets.
To gauge whether G1 is to be accepted e.g., by a reg-
ulator, it is reasonable to present an additional argument
to justify the sufficiency of confidence in the claim (and,
as a consequence, the overall argument fragment shown).
For instance, as in [2], a qualitative confidence argument
may be created in which it is argued that (a) there is
credible support for the inference asserted via the claims
G1.1, G2.1 and G2.2 that G1 is true, (b) the assurance
deficits for this asserted inference have been identified
and (c) that the residual assurance deficits are acceptable.
Unfortunately, although there is some guidance available
on identifying where the assurance deficits lie [7], there is
little guidance on how it may be gauged that the residual
assurance deficit is acceptable. Here, the challenge for the
regulator is in assessing that a qualitative argument (i.e.,
the confidence argument) provides sufficient confidence in
another qualitative argument (i.e., the safety argument).
We believe that quantification of uncertainty and a
measurement-based approach to evaluate the safety argu-
ment is an objective alternative for such decision-making.
In this paper, we examine one approach towards quantifying
confidence (uncertainty), and discuss the challenges therein.
This approach will augment, rather than replace, qualitative
arguments in a safety case.
B. Uncertainty Measurement
The sources of uncertainty in the argument for G1 (fig-
ure 1) are mainly:
(U1): Uncertainty in the sensor values is stochastic
(aleatory) and it is attributed, in part, to the probability of
failure of the Pitot probe, and to any errors in conversion of
the sensed analog values to an appropriate digital equivalent.
Figure 2. Bayesian network showing quantification of confidence in the claim given the sources of uncertainty in the argument fragment
In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that
analog to digital conversion is perfect. This uncertainty
is given by the variance in the measured failure rate (or
probability of failure on demand) obtained, say, through
statistical testing of the sensor and as specified on the sensor
datasheets.
(U2): Uncertainty that specification is correct contains
both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties: the calibration
error of the Pitot probe (when the probe has not failed) is a
source of aleatory uncertainty that contributes to the overall
uncertainty in the correctness of the specification, whereas
the uncertainty as to whether the formula for computing
the angle of attack has been correctly used is the source
of epistemic uncertainty. Calibration of the air-data probe is
experimentally performed in a wind tunnel [8]. A confidence
level can be used to effectively specify the confidence in
the experiment and is obtained from statistical analysis
of the corresponding empirical data. The confidence that
the correct formula for computing the angle of attack is
subjectively gauged by reviewing the specification against
flight control theory by domain experts i.e., the aircraft
design team.
(U3): Uncertainty that the implementation is correct is
the uncertainty in the verification procedure i.e., the proof of
correctness. The verification chain begins with parsing and
pre-processing of the code, after which logical annotations
are inferred based on the formal specification. Verification
conditions (VC) are obtained from the annotated code by
processing the latter with a verification condition generator
(VCG). These are simplified, translated to TPTP [Reference
needed], where various scripts then control first-order the-
orem provers to prove the VC from a set of axioms (some
of which are static, and others are generated dynamically).
Uncertainty in the proof of correctness is a combination
of each of the elements involved in the verification chain.
For this paper, we mainly gauge (U3) via the subjective
judgment from the developers of the theorem prover, and
leave the modeling of the sources of uncertainty in the
verification chain, for future work.
Both (U2) and (U3) are epistemic uncertainties. Addi-
tional epistemic uncertainties arise from assurance deficits
[2] in the safety argument itself.
(U4): Uncertainty in the sufficiency of the sub-claims
(solutions) is the uncertainty whether the sub-claims (solu-
tions) e.g., G1.1, G2.1, G2.2, are appropriate and sufficient
to infer the parent claim (sub-claim) e.g., G1, or whether
there is a need for additional sub-claims (solutions). In the
context of multi-legged arguments [4], there is the additional
uncertainty about the acceptability of a given argument leg,
when there may be evidence to the contrary in another
argument leg.
(U5): Uncertainty in the appropriateness of the context
reflects on whether the context used for a claim or a strategy
is appropriate.
C. Assessment of Confidence
To assess the uncertainty (confidence) in the claim G1,
first we model the confidence in the claim and the sources
of uncertainty (U1) - (U5) respectively as discrete random
variables (r.v.); subsequently we characterize the overall
confidence in the argument as the joint distribution of the
r.v., and we use a Bayesian network (BN1) [9] to quantify
this joint distribution.
A Bayesian paradigm is appropriate in this context be-
cause it permits the inclusion of both subjective and quan-
titative data. Additionally, BN allow us to (1) compute
the joint distribution of r.v. by exploiting the conditional
independence between the r.v. and (2) perform inference
when evidence2 is available. The structure of then network
encodes the assumptions of conditional independence. Thus,
1The singular and the plural forms are given by the same acronym
2Note that evidence supplied in the BN is distinctly different from the
evidence supplied in the safety argument itself. The former is evidence of
increasing (or complete) credibility in the latter.
Table I
MAPPING R.V. STATES TO A UNIT INTERVAL
State Interval
Very Low [0, 0.2)
Low [0.2, 0.4)
Medium [0.4, 0.6)
High [0.6, 0.8)
Very High [0.8, 1]
the arcs represent dependencies between the r.v. and may be
interpreted as correlation. Each of the r.v. has a defined set
of states and an associated probability distribution over those
states.
In the BN shown in figure 2, the root node Claim
Accepted (a node with only incoming arcs) models the
confidence in the claim G1. The leaf nodes (nodes without
incoming arcs) model each of the identified sources of
uncertainty e.g., the node Proof models the confidence in
the solution E3: Proof of correctness, corresponding to the
source of uncertainty (U3). The intermediate nodes (nodes
with both incoming and outgoing arcs e.g., Computation
Correct) abstract and aggregate relevant leaf nodes; addi-
tionally, they serve to reduce the complexity associated with
the specification of conditional probabilities and in post-
specification inference.
All the nodes in the BN have the same set of five
states: 〈very low, low, medium, high, very high〉 which are
mapped to the interval [0, 1] as shown in Table I. Such a
mapping allows including confidence values that have been
obtained from both quantitative data (e.g., the confidence
level associated with the experimental calibration of the air
data probe), and from qualitative means (e.g., the reviewer
confidence in specification correctness).
The quantitative specification for each of the leaf nodes
is given as a prior probability distribution over the states
of the node; in particular, we use a (doubly) truncated
Normal distribution [10] whose mean is the prior belief (or
measure) of confidence and the variance is picked so as to
appropriately represent the confidence in this prior itself.
For intermediate nodes and the root nodes we specify a
prior conditional probability distribution (CPD) in a para-
metric way, again using a truncated Normal distribution.
Here, the mean of the distribution is the weighted average
of the parent r.v. while the variance is the inverse of the
sum of the weights [10]. The weights can be considered as
modeling the “strength of correlation” between the r.v. In the
context of a safety argument, this would be viewed as the
importance assigned to the contribution of a certain source
of uncertainty to the overall confidence.
Thus, if Cc, Cp, Cs and Ccc are the r.v. modeling the con-
fidence in the accurate calibration of the air data probe, the
correctness of the proof, the correctness of the specification,
and the correct computation respectively, pi(X) is a prior
distribution over a random variable X , and NT (µ, σ2) is
the truncated Normal distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2, we have:
• pi(Cc) ∼ NT (µc, σ2c ), where µc is given by the confi-
dence measure of the experiment. In Figure 2, pi(Cc) ∼
NT (0.9, 0.05) corresponds to the prior measure of a
90% confidence level in the calibration experiment of
the air data probe.
• pi(Cp) ∼ NT (µp, σ2p), where µp is given by is given
by the subjective measure of confidence in the proof.
In Figure 2, pi(Cp) ∼ NT (0.9, 0.05) would be inter-
preted, for instance, that there is a priori “very high”
confidence in the proof of correctness to be supplied as
evidence.
• pi(Ccc|Cp, Cs) ∼ NT (µcc, σ2cc) is the CPD of the
confidence in correct computation, given the confidence
in the proof and the specification; µcc is given as
((100Cp + 100Cs)/200) i.e., the weighted average of
the parent r.v., with each given equal weight; σ2cc is
chosen as the inverse of the sum of weights i.e., 0.005.
The specification of the priors for the rest of the r.v.
in the BN (Figure 2) is given in a similar way. Once the
specification of the BN is complete additional evidence of
confidence may be included, if available, to examine how
this modifies the confidence in the overall claim.
IV. DISCUSSION
There are several challenges when considering the quan-
tification of uncertainty (confidence) in a safety argument as
presented. The primary challenge is justifying and validating
the model used for quantification. This is addressed at
several levels:
where confidence is measurable e.g., through quantitative
empirical data and statistical analysis, inclusion of confi-
dence into the model is justifiable and straightforward. When
considering subjective assessment of uncertainty,
1. Development of the BN Potentially automatable from
the identified uncertainty sources in the GSN and the GSN
structure itself. Augment the syntax of the GSN with a
placeholder for an appropriate confidence measure.
2. Justification of the leaf node probabilities: Where
available, from quantitative data e.g., confidence levels in
statistical experiments.
3. Justification of the CPD/ CPT: Are the conditional
probabilities of a node given its parents representative of
the true likelihood?
4. Justification of the weights: Based on the importance
given to each path in the argument chain starting from goals
down to evidence.
5. Justification for the BN structure: Are the assumptions
of conditional independence valid?
6. Scaling the approach to the overall argument: problems
of dependence between argument legs [3]
7. Some benefits: Reasoning about the confidence in a
quantitative way may explicitly highlight issues not other-
wise apparent from qualitative reasoning? For example, if a
high prior confidence is given to a certain evidence source,
this can be called out during assessment
V. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusion goes here. this is more of the conclusion
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